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Through an ethnographic focus on Muslim neighbourhoods in a North Indian city, 
this article traces the effects of increasing digitisation of Public Distribution 
Systems (PDS) and ID provision in India by examining the implications for 
relations between the state, low-level political actors and local populaces.  The 
article explores the practice of sifarish (leaning on someone to get something done) 
which, it is argued, cannot be seen within simplistic rubrics of ‘corruption’ but 
instead comprises a socially embedded ethical continuum.  With one of the stated 
aims of digitisation being the displacing of informal mediation, the ethnographic 
material illuminates the efforts of low-level political actors to navigate emerging 
digital infrastructures.  Digitisation, however, does not end mediation and carries 
with it ideological, political and economic interests.  This, the article argues, 
enables state/people spaces of mediation to be commodified and marketized and 
further cements processes of marginalisation experienced by India’s Muslim 
minority.   
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On the 1st of July 2015 the Indian Prime Minister, Nerandra Modi made a speech at an event 
titled ‘Digitising India’ in which he stated, ‘digitalisation of all government work is essential 
to deal with problems like corruption, help provide transparent and efficient governance and 
bridge the rich-poor divide’ (The Telegraph India 2015).  The speech formed part of an ongoing 
process which, as with increased use of ICT in various parts of the world, aims to ‘escape the 
limits of the old paper state’ (Breckenridge 2014: 16).  Digitisation projects in India have come 
to embody notions of good governance, transparency, modernity and anti-corruption.  They are 
also imagined as a means to address marginalisation and social exclusion through providing 
direct connections between people and the state (Rao & Greenleaf 2013).   
Yet, ethnographic and other research has illuminated the unpredictable ways in which 
digitisation plays out.  In poor neighbourhoods of Delhi, for example, fingerprint readers 
utilised within India’s biometric registration system could not detect the prints of homeless 
people due to lifetimes of ware on the flesh (Rao & Greenleaf 2013; cf.  Rao 2018).  During 
fieldwork for this article, in the provincial North-Indian city of Saharanpur and surrounding 
areas, similar issues were reported amongst manual labourers and agricultural workers.  
Additionally, the use of iris scanners had triggered rumours of blinding and mind reading in 
some outlying villages.  The intersection of human and non-human – within India and 
elsewhere – often means that digitisation is not a quick fix solution to address marginalisation 
and/or lack of inclusion but an (often messy) assemblage of bodies, technologies and 
algorithms which situate digitisation within broader ‘sociotechnical systems’ (Lowrie 2018).  
Simultaneously, the digitization of state bureaucracies are not detached from broader 




privilege and exclusion (Graham 2005) and remain deeply embedded in social relations (Rao 
& Nair 2019). 
By focusing on the Muslim mohallas (neighbourhoods) and villages surrounding Saharanpur, 
this article traces the effects of increasing digitisation of Public Distribution Systems (PDS) 
and ID provision (such as the newly introduced biometric Aadhaar card).  These bureaucratic 
and material transformations are bound up not only in the construction of the Indian state but 
also within global processes of technological and ideological change (cf: Lowrie 2018).  The 
article focuses on implications for everyday relations between the state, low-level Muslim netas 
(politicians) and pradhans (village heads) – serving as representatives in Saharanpur’s Nagar 
Palika Parishad (City Council) or in nearby Gram Panchayats (Village Councils) – and those 
they represented.  Here, the emphasis falls onto the practice of sifarish (leaning on someone to 
get something done), the exercise of which was key to legitimising the authority of local netas 
and other political actors.   
Against this background, the article makes three primary arguments.  Firstly, that sifarish 
cannot be conceptualised within a simplistic rubric of ‘corruption’ but sits within an ambivalent 
ethical continuum.  Sifarish acts as a conduit in processes of claim-making between 
marginalised people and the state (albeit in ways that are cross-cut by embedded social 
relations).  Whilst similar arguments are reflected in earlier ethnographic work from India and 
elsewhere (Gupta 1995; Singerman 1995; Ruud 2000; Smith 2001; Mitchell 2002; Shah 2009; 
Piliavsky 2014; Bear & Mathur 2015; Ghandi 2016), I add to the preceding literature by 
showing how the performance of sifarish is a central means through which low-level Muslims 
netas carry favour and cement authority amongst their vote-base by ‘leaning on’ officials, 
bureaucrats and others in order facilitate the applications, paperwork and documents of those 




processes of political, economic, ideological and technological transformation, and localised 
moral economies, socially embedded relations and forms ethical practice.  With the 
marginalisation of Indian Muslims intensifying across the country (Jafferlot & Gayer 2012; 
Chatterjee 2017; Jayal 2019; author 2020a), digitisation not only undermines more informal 
conduits of connection between marginalised people and the state but also interplays with the 
ideological positioning of a nationalist politics that is increasingly focused on the establishment 
of a ‘Hindu Rastra’ (Hindu Nation) (Harriss et al, 2017) and with a post-liberalisation 
economic landscape that foregrounds neoliberal models of development (Münster & Strümpell 
2014).   
Secondly, the paper shows that, contrary to many official representations, the material 
transformations heralded by digitisation are no less ambivalent than are pre-existing, socially 
embedded networks.  Whilst various continuities persist, the material transformations that 
comprise digitisation of ID and PDS provisioning are altering spaces of mediation between 
people and the state.  Rather than dis-embedding mediation from the social and the political, 
however, digitisation carries with it the ideological and political environments in which it is 
deployed and becomes entangled in interplays at local, national and international scales.  At a 
more theoretical level, and in a context where some strands of assemblage theory – through the 
dilution of human agency and de-reification of ‘the social’ – (cf. Latour 2005) have moved 
towards a distinctly organic representation of relations between humans, technologies and other 
non-human actants, this article demonstrates the continued relevance of political economy 
within bio-technological assemblages (cf. Fine 2005).   
Finally, the article illuminates how digitization can become a carrier of hegemonic market 
interests by enabling the state/people space of mediation to be commodified and marketized – 




through which mediation pathways operate (Chaudhuri 2019; Elyachar 2010; Simone 2004; 
Singerman 1996) constitute a distinctly spatial context.  As Doreen Massey (1992) has argued, 
space is constructed through social interrelations but “…the social is [also] inexorably also 
spatial” (p.80). Given these spatial properties, and despite highly blurred boundaries (Gupta 
1995), spaces of mediation offer – as with urban space, spaces of culture, spaces of nature, 
spaces of artisanal or peasant production and non-capitalist space – a frontier for forms of 
(primitive) accumulation.  It also leads to degrees of displacement (albeit in ways that are 
incomplete, contested and uneven) of the peopled infrastructures within which sifarish and 
related practices are embedded,  These transformations, I contend, act as a conduit which 
further intensifies the draining of power from the Muslim minority population.  As David 
Harvey (2007: 23) argues: 
The creation of […a] neoliberal system has entailed much destruction, not only of 
prior institutional frameworks and powers (such as the supposed prior state 
sovereignty over political-economic affairs) but also of divisions of labor, social 
relations, welfare provisions, technological mixes, ways of life, attachments to the 
land, habits of the heart, ways of thought, and the like. 
The article is based on ethnographic fieldwork conducted in 2016 and 2017.  This involved 
spending time with various actors and ‘hanging out’ at sites of mediation such as ration stores, 
government bureaus and the offices of agents and brokers.  Additionally, 50 interviews were 
conducted with the public and a further 40 with mediators including netas, pradhans, social 
workers, ration dealers and agents.  The article also draws on from my decade-long engagement 
with the area (cf. author 2018; 2019; 2020a) and from material developed through research-led 
teaching in the UK (author 2020b). The text is arranged into five sections.  The first, provides 




programs against a background of intensifying marginalisation of India’s Muslim minority.  
This is followed by a section tracing shifts from a ‘paper’ to a ‘digital’ state at both structural 
and everyday levels.  I then turn to providing a detailed account of sifarish, its everyday 
enactments and the interplays between the long-standing peopled infrastructures in which it is 
embedded and digital transformations.  Finally, I offer ethnographic and broader material to 
trace how ‘spaces of mediation’ provide sites for accumulation through dispossession and 
marketisation.      
Digital Dilemmas in the Mohalla  
I had known Usman1 for eight years.  His house, larger than most in the neighbourhood, was 
situated in a crowded mohalla in the north of Saharanpur.  Usman, a sturdy man in his mid-40s 
of a kind and welcoming disposition, lived with his wife, two daughters and three sons.  The 
eldest son was married, with one child, and his daughters were studying at college level.  His 
second son, in his early 20s, worked with his brother in the family’s furniture making business, 
consisting a small workshop and a showroom.  The final son was somewhat younger and 
attended a local English Medium School.  As a local ward-level2 neta, Usman held sway within 
the community he represented and often cultivated social networks and support in the narrow 
gullies (lanes) that constituted the area.   
Like many netas, his position enabled him a degree of access to the state and influence within 
local government and civil infrastructure.  For Usman, and those he represented, utilising 
sifarish to lean on officials in order to ease the passage of documentation and assist in obtaining 
forms of identification or PDS provisioning was envisioned as an obligation to voters and 
community rather than as ‘corruption’.  Thus, Usman’s ability to perform sifarish was central 
to legitimising his position as a local neta.  Voters supported him on the basis that he would 




up, being able to do so – or at least engage in performances which displayed ‘potential’ to do 
so – were key illustrations of power and authority in the eyes of others.   
Recently, however, online processing of applications for cards, documents and paperwork had 
reconfigured mediation pathways and impinged upon performances of sifarish, as Usman 
describes: 
People always come to my house.  If someone comes and says they need a ration 
card, then I should help as I am the neta.  I can do this because in the [government] 
department I have respect.  People can use me to put pressure on officials, or they 
can use money [he laughs].  When the officers see money they make no mistakes 
[in the application].  In every department everyone takes a bribe.  If they do not 
have money, then they must ask me to lean on that official.   
Often people complain that I am not helping them.  That person [referring to a local 
man waiting to speak with him] is saying “yaar tumne mera kam nahi karaya” 
[phaa! You did not do my work] … but how can I make a card for him when the 
[web] site is closed.  Before the computer system we could do these things with 
our sources but now it’s difficult […] Educated people understand the computer 
system but here many are uneducated and cannot understand why we are not able 
to make the system work.  They blame me and say that I am not doing their work, 
they think that sifarish is needed but cannot see that the computer does not listen 
to any pressure.  If the system for applications is closed so it is closed!  Now 
everything depends on the computer system and not on sources.  Only when the 
site is open can the feeding [of the computer] start.   
Waseem was a neta from a neighbourhood close to Usman’s.  A little older and considered 




Management System (RCMS) was introduced.  Unlike paper processes, utilising sifarish to 
hasten an application had become challenging as officials themselves were rendered impotent: 
If the website is open, then we do not need to worry about it.  We just call the 
officers and at once the work is done.  However, now the website is closed, so we 
are waiting as even the officer can do nothing.  When it is open there is no tension 
as I know all the officers very well.  I have been a neta here for 40 years, so 
everybody knows me.  When everything was on paper then usually I could do the 
work but now it is not always possible.   
Usman’s and Waseem’s narratives illustrate the ambiguities and tensions experienced by low-
level netas.  As Stuart Corbridge et al (2012) point out, low level government actors of various 
types, experience complex pressures originating from higher up the political and state 
infrastructure and from ‘…poorer ‘clients’, citizens and family members’ (p.152) (cf. Shah 
2009).  For both Waseem and Usman, these pressures, when intersected with the shift to online 
and digital forms of bureaucratic governance, challenged their ability to perform sifarish, and 
thus risked the undermining of their authority in the eyes of others.  On the surface, then, these 
online systems had done exactly what was intended by dis-embedding applications from the 
local social context, rationalising the system and giving ordinary people direct connections to 
the state.  As the following sections of this article show, however, digitisation – whilst creating 
degrees of transformation – did not eliminate state-people mediation and remained deeply 
embroiled with the marginalising processes experienced by Indian Muslims.      
Indian Muslims, Identity, Digitization & the State  
In the context of Saharanpur’s Muslim mohallas, as from many Muslims elsewhere in India 
(Jayal 2019), enactments of citizenship, forms of claim-making and identity or PDS 




India’s Muslim communities. Marginalisation is empirically prominent but also variegated, 
non-homogeneous and crosscut by intersections of class, gender, affluence and lineage (cf. 
Ahmad 2003; Jayal 2019; Author 2020a).  The Indian model of nationhood is founded on ideals 
of ‘multiple citizenships’ which encompasses “various ways of being Indian” (Shaban 2016: 
2), a vision of a plural Indianness that was articulated by its proponents in the independence 
movement as ‘composite nationalism’ (Madnī 2005 [1938]). 
In practice, however, there are many sections of the Indian population who experience the lived 
reality of citizenship in a graduated form.  This ‘graduated citizenship’ (cf. Ong 2006; author 
2020a) is inflected in the everyday realities of minority and marginalised groups (e.g. Dalits, 
Adivasis, Indian Muslims, tribal communities, informal workers, etc.), limiting access to 
welfare, development programs and judicial rights.  These inequalities are further entrenched 
by experiences of structural and physical violence (cf. Gupta 2012; Gorringe, 2017; Nilsen, 
2018; Sanchez 2016; Shaban 2018; Author 2020a).  Whilst processes of marginalisation are 
constituted over long duration – and span both colonial and post-colonial contexts (Author 
2020a) – it is questions of identity and citizenship that have become foregrounded of late3.    
Amongst other interventions, the Indian government has initiated the Citizenship Amendment 
Act (CAA), with additional proposals for a National Register of Citizens (NRC) pending.  
These acts create potentiality for Indian residents to be classified as non-citizens if they are 
unable to produce the documentation showing they were born in India before 1987 or, if born 
between 1987 and 2003, have at least one parent born in the country (Bhat 2019).  With 
registration low (Bhatia & Bhabha 2017), some individuals may find themselves classified as 
‘illegal’ migrants and thus liable to internment or deportation.  The most controversial, and 
potentially unconstitutional, aspects of the bill concerns exceptions based on religion which 




citizenship on the basis of assumed religious persecution whilst excluding Muslim ‘illegal’ 
migrants from the same countries (Bhat 2019).  The implication being that Muslims who – 
whether through actual immigration to India or simply due to a lack of paperwork – cannot 
prove their right to citizenship will likely face differentiated consequences from non-Muslims.   
The CAA and NRC represent very material – in the sense of being legitimised within the law 
– enactments of graduated citizenship along communal lines, but are also symptomatic of the 
broader side-lining of Muslims within the state’s bureaucracy.  As with other marginalised 
groups, for Saharanpur’s Muslim residents mediators, intermediaries and ‘street-level 
bureaucrats’ played a central role in translating state procedures into a vernacularized form and 
assisted in navigating opaque bureaucratic structures and forms of unequal access (cf. 
Chaudhuri 2019; Corbridge et al 2012; Hoag 2010).  Whilst this article tracks bureaucratic 
transformations pre-CAA, it does so in a context of increasing digitisation and use of biometric 
technologies that are central to these developing legislative acts.   
Fundamental here, is the Aadhaar Card, the world’s largest biometric ID system launched in 
2009 (Rao & Greenleaf 2013).  This involves creating a massive citizenry database housed 
within the Central Identities Data Repository (CIDR) (UIDAI 2019).  Aadhaar – along with 
numerous other projects within India’s state bureaucracy – is intended to increase inclusion, 
address identity gaps, monitor civil servants, rationalise welfare, and circumvent informal 
channels of brokerage and mediation (Bhatia & Bhabha 2017).  Hence, the digitisation of 
India’s PDS and ID provision is often imagined as an “…(anti-political) force that is able to 
penetrate the layers of mediation […,] layers inhabited by the various middlemen, 
intermediaries, brokers, fixers, and even politicians who […] encumber the relations between 
state and society” (Noy 2014: 108).  This is not limited to the Aadhaar card alone.  Thus, Ration 




applications and amendments (Masiero 2015), ration shops are now monitored through 
Electronic Point of Sale (EPOS) machines (Chaudhuri 2019) and schemes associated with the 
Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) are now mediated 
through a Management Information System (MIS) (Aggarwal 2017).   
Emerging literature on digitisation in India shows inconsistences in combating leakages (Drèze 
& Khera 2017) and details ongoing exclusions or rights violations (Prakash & Masiero 2015; 
Drèze & Khera 2017; Aggarwal 2017).  Little explored, however, are ways in which emerging 
digital materialities are re-configuring forms of mediation.  Silvia Masiero (2017) argues that 
digital modes of mediation have produced new geographies of exclusion based around uneven 
access.  Building on Corbridge et al’s (2005) argument that the state is ‘seen’ and imagined 
through encounters with anti-poverty and other programs, Masiero suggests that digitisation 
creates new imaginaries of the state within which governments can present themselves as high-
tech problem solvers.  Masiero indicates that this image is not solidified and is often contested 
by citizens, but also warns that digitisation can ‘be a carrier of a policy agenda, which if 
implemented may significantly transform the existing reality of anti-poverty structures’ (p.404-
405).  Whilst these changes represent tangible structural transformations, anthological 
contributions have long nuanced power relations embedded in bureaucratic activity with the 
aim of better understanding forms of ethical practice, affective considerations, and negotiations 
of power, rather than simply positing an oppressive bureaucracy against passive, subjugated 
citizens (Bear & Mathur 2015; Author et al 2019).  It is to this longer lineage of contributions 
– which span both paper-based and digital contexts – that the following section now turns.     
Bureaucratic Materialities: From Paper to Digital States  
Debates on bureaucracy have long involved tensions between seeing bureaucracy as symbolic 




authority, coercion and (class) power (Marx 2011 [1867]; Arendt 1967; Gramsci 1971; Weber 
1978; Foucault 1980).  Ethnographic material, however, has illustrated that power lies not only 
in bureaucratic structures and the actions of bureaucrats but also in mundane everyday 
interactions.  Here, bureaucracies may render the claim-maker or citizen passive by, for 
example, making them wait (Jeffery 2010; Auyero 2012; Hoag 2011), by performing degrees 
of (often racial, gender and class-based) indifference (Hertzfeld 1992), via the fetishization of 
systems, procedures and documents (Gordillo 2006; Folch 2012) or through structural violence 
(Gupta 2012).  Yet, we also understand the messiness, negotiations and contestations at 
intersections between states and populations (e.g. Corbridge et al 2005; Mathur 2016; author 
et al 2019; Truelove 2020); a juncture which is often blurred, ambiguous and occupied by 
multiple actors (both human and non-human) who dissipate notions of the state as a clearly 
identifiable, homogenous entity (Mitchell 1999; Gupta 2005; Mathur 2017).   
Documents can reinforce state power and render the state present in the homes, workplaces and 
pockets of citizens (Scott 1998).  Paper documents and online processes can act against 
individual agency, rendering citizens and others as passive ‘patients of the state’ by, for 
example, producing temporalities of marginalisation (Auyero 2012).  Simultaneously, the 
ability of certain forms of documentation to embody the state can make them desirable.  Gaston 
Gordillo (2006), for example, describes how a campaign to be recognised as citizens enacted 
by the indigenous Argentine Chaco community led, when successful, to the fetishization of 
state documents as symbolic of belonging.  Gordillo, however, reminds us that fetishization 
was produced in a historical context of violence and exclusion, thus blurring the 
subject/subjected dichotomy and emphasising the interrelations of material artefacts with 




The mediating qualities of documents, cards and paperwork can, however, be inverted in 
various ways.  Fake documents, for example, may embody the aura of the state to the same 
degree as their authentic counterparts (Srivastava 2012). Paperwork – such as Right to 
Information Requests – when deployed by activists may reverse disciplining process, turning 
the lens towards government bureaucrats (Webb 2013; Mathur 2016).  Citizenship, and its 
associated documentation, may be refused – as with many Tibetan refugees in India – in order 
to maintain claims to sovereignty elsewhere (Mcgranahan 2016).  Whilst variegated, clearly 
documents and paperwork are key mediators between populations and the state.  Matthew Hull 
(2012a) illustrates this in the context of urban planning in Islamabad (Pakistan), which he sees 
as being constituted and negotiated through ‘a regime of paper documents’ (p.1).  Here, ‘order 
and disorder […] are produced through the ceaseless circulation of millions of maps, forms, 
letters, and reports among bureaucrats, politicians, property owners, Imams (prayer leaders), 
businessmen and builders’ (p.4).  Hull points out that, as with other forms of human and non-
human mediation, the role played by documents is often invisibilised, a process which is itself 
a ‘tactic of power’ (2012b: 253; cf. Mathur 2017).  As with Michael Foucault’s (1977) 
deliberations on ‘power’ more generally, for Hull, the power enshrined in state documents and 
cards is often ambivalent and can be both oppressive and productive (at times simultaneously).   
On occasion such enactments of power might be explicit – the attempts to make legal 
distinctions between Muslim and non-Muslim ‘illegal’ migrants in the CAA and NRC, for 
example – but they may also become entangled with apparently mundane acts.  A common 
complaint in Saharanpur concerned the mis-spelling of Muslim names by Hindu officials.  This 
could have long-term implications lasting years or even lifetimes.  In a nearby town I met 
Rizwan, a school teacher in his mid-40s with three teenage sons.  Rizwan had invested in their 




eldest son’s passport, however, past errors in various unrelated documents created a series of 
problems: 
I went to get my son’s passport with his birth certificate and a letter from the school.  
They asked also for my wife’s ID like a ration card but I did not have it so I had to 
get our marriage certificate.  This was in Urdu so I got it translated into English 
and stamped by the court.  No one had noticed, though, that her name on my son’s 
birth certificate was spelt wrong (Asna instead of Asma), so I had to get it changed 
which needed a bribe.  Finally, I got the new certificate but they said they had to 
refer to the health register where my wife’s name was again misspelt.  I then had 
to go and get a certificate from the hospital where my son was born and only then 
did I get the passport.   
We also had many problems with the ration card.  Some clerk had not written the 
names of my family members but instead just written famous Muslim names like 
Akbar and Aziz.  There must have been a survey years ago, but the surveyors 
couldn’t be bother to visit our house and just wrote some Muslim names.  
Government officials can never learn our names.  My mother is so ashamed as her 
name is Amir Bano but in all her official documents she has the male name Amir 
Khan (also a famous Bollywood actor).  In the Aadhaar card and ID card the 
spelling may be different.  When the officers see this they may reject our cards.  It 
is the officer’s mistake.  Hindu officials always have problems writing our names.  
If we check it straight away we can stop them otherwise nothing can be done later.   
Issues surrounding accidental or intentional mis-spelling of Muslim names had not disappeared 
with the arrival of digitisation but instead became bound up in interconnections between online 




the intentional and unintentional acts of bureaucrats and others, marginalising forces 
experienced by Muslims in the city continued within processes of bureaucratic transformation 
and were not diminished through digital ‘rationalisation’.  As Ian Lowrie (2018) points out, the 
intermeshing of humans and digital infrastructures “…ensures that aesthetic, epistemological, 
economic, and political structures are thoroughly woven into these computational networks, 
tightly coupling the technical to the social as they experiment with new [and, we can add, 
existing] forms of work and life” (p.349).  On the flip side of marginalisation, however, various 
street level bureaucrats and others also continued to intervene in digital processes on behalf of 
those with whom they had social connections.  Similarly, writing on Rajasthan and Andhra 
Pradesh, Bidisha Chaudhuri (2019) has shown how government appointed Fair Price Shop 
owners who were “monitored by biometric machines to ensure they are not illegally leaking 
civil supplies [also helped…] citizens/residents cope with the new (biometric) technologies in 
public services by using various mechanisms to make the technologies work within the context 
of the everyday” (p.573).  It is a focus on interventions on behalf of others that draws us to a 
deeper consideration of sifarish, the practice of which long pre-dates emergent digital 
reconfigurations.   
‘Lean on Me’: The Moral Continuum of Sifarish 
If digitisation does not exemplify political neutrality and rationality, then our consideration of 
the relationship between sifarish and digitisation must begin with an exploration of the 
everyday normative constructs within which sifarish operates.  Ethnographic work from South 
Asia (e.g. Ruud 2000; Shah 2009; Piliavsky 2014; Bear & Mathur 2015; Ghandi 2016) and 
elsewhere (e.g. Smith 2001; Mitchell 2002) has illustrated a diversity in forms of patronage, 
clientelism and other practices, that move beyond simplistic frameworks of ‘corruption’.  As 




that these are practices developed within a fully mature normative system of no less moral 
validity than any other normative system’ (p.271) (cf. Smith 2001).  Writing on Pakistan, Nasir 
Islam (2004) details some of these ambiguities in the context of sifarish where bureaucrats and 
political actors feel ‘compelled under family and kinship group pressure to oblige their clients 
[...] Those who do not play the sifarish game risk a ‘bad reputation’ or even ostracization’ 
(pp.322-323). 
Sadia Nadeem and Neelab Kayani (2017) locate sifarish within a broader rubric of affective 
and informal means of networking including guanxi in China, blat in Russia and wasta in the 
Arab world, and define it as ‘the act of obtaining ends on the basis of network 
recommendations’ (p.1).  Nadeem and Kayani accurately point out that sifarish is not seen as 
inherently immoral but contains both moral and immoral modes (a continuum) of performing 
sifarish.  Also writing on Pakistan, Alexander Evans (2012) argues that processes of 
modernisation and urbanisation have not led to a decline in the prevalence of sifarish as a 
means of linking to, and making claims upon, state or other resources.  Evans suggests that 
sifarish is flexible enough to reform itself during social and political change and ascribes 
further reasons for sifarish’s prevalence: The uncertain nature of state delivery (which renders 
personal avenues more effective) and the alienability citizens feel from the state.  Here, a more 
personal politics allows affirmation of a politician’s position and demonstrates ‘…the value of 
that individual in terms of promoting and protecting their followers’ (Evans 2012: 215).    
For netas in Saharanpur, displaying these capacities was key during election periods, with the 
capability to obtain PDS and ID provision for others often central during canvassing.  However, 
complaints about broken promises made by netas keen to win votes were commonplace, as 




The neta of our area filled this form for my pension.  He does this so that he will 
get votes but I have not heard anything for a long time, and [now that he is elected] 
he will not answer my requests.     
Forms of exclusion often become configured around local and familial politics.  Farida, a 
recently divorced woman, described how her former husband’s relationship with a local neta 
led to him blocking her from obtaining a ration card independent of her ex-husband’s family.  
Sifarish, then, is bound up in networks of sociality and intimate politics.  Yet, netas and others 
also emphasised their contradictory position and the pressures they were embroiled in (cf. 
Corbridge et al 2012).  Whilst seen as holders of access to the state, this was often limited by 
low-level political position and membership of a marginalised Muslim community.  On a 
sweltering evening in 2017 I visited Mehboob, a neta in his mid-thirties.  He was starting his 
second term following recent elections.  Once we had settled into conversation, I challenged 
Mehboob on complaints about netas making ‘false promises’: 
All candidates do it, not only me.  The public do not realise that [obtaining state 
resources and documents] is difficult work.  There are powerful people who may 
interfere and there are rules and quotas.  People say, “you made promises to us, it 
was fake promises, so I will not give you my vote in the future”.  But in every 
department the system is difficult.  Government programs are full of tension for us.  
This is the biggest problem for us, always there is political pressure.   
This was a common narrative, often discussed in terms of dual pressure from constituents and 
the state.  In a village 8km outside Saharanpur, Sajid, the local pradhan described ‘…for some 
people you cannot say no [to performing sifarish] as you have links to them.  Also, they put 
pressure through voting, so then it is hard to refuse’. The divergence between promises and 




legitimise their authority even in the context of failure.  Amongst other actions, this involved 
the public berating of officials.  Although a change in outcome may not result, the neta had at 
least displayed their authority in the eyes of their constituents (see: author et al 2019). 
Yet to reduce sifarish to instrumentality would negate more complex motivations.  Usman 
(whose story opened this article) saw sifarish not only as a means to get things done but as a 
moral duty.  Sitting in his home, we discussed the recent Food Security Act (FSA).  Introduced 
in 2013, the  FSA was to provide subsidised grains to Below Poverty Line (BPL) households, 
but it’s rollout proved controversial with accusations of vote buying (Banerjee et al 2014) and 
of negative impacts on farmers (Peschard 2014).  For Usman, however, his concern surrounded 
area-based quotas which did not account for variability on the BPL population numbers4, an 
uneven distribution that required an ethical fix (cf. Rao 2018; Pia 2017).  Without the ability 
to influence policy, the primary tool available was sifarish, which he described using to help 
people bypass the quota.  After explaining this, Usman leant across the table and, in a sincere 
tone, said ‘this is not a fair system as poor areas loose out.  If I get a family registered [with 
sifarish] then this is my duty’.  Sifarish, then, is normatively constructed and understood within 
its own localised moral and ethical frameworks.  Along with other sets of relations and 
practices, it also forms a deeply embedded web of infrastructural conduits through which 
people/state interactions take place.  The final empirical section of this article turns to the 
processes embedded within digitisation that enable degrees of commodification of these 
informal spatialised infrastructures and details the implications this has for marginalised 
Muslims in Saharanpur’s mohallas.  
The Commodification of Mediation Spaces 
At the opening of this article I argued that sites of mediation should be considered in spatial 




elsewhere as peopled infrastructures mediated (for better or worse) through socially embedded 
political networks become, to degrees, marketized and through accumulation by dispossession.  
In his work on HIV and AIDS prevention and control programs (funded by Word Bank loans) 
in Pakistan, Ayaz Qureshi (2015) has illustrated how these programs became commodified 
through neoliberal models of development which foregrounded market-driven, over state-
based, forms of delivery. This, Qureshi argues, created a context where World Bank money 
was primarily paid to international NGOs and private sector businesses or consultancies, rather 
than making the ‘risk groups’ – who were the stated target of the programs – the main 
beneficiaries.  This, Qureshi suggests, leads to the “dispossession of many for accumulation by 
some in the ambiguous space created by the reorganization of AIDS bureaucracy” (p.46) 
In discussing the UK government’s digitally-based Transparency Agenda (TA) – a system 
through which the public, the press and others can monitor and ‘witness’ the expenses claims 
and salaries of MPs, senior civil servants and other officials – Penny Harvey et al (2012) show 
how TA not only led to new ambivalences but also created the material conditions – an 
‘entrepreneurial’ space – within which private sector mediators could flourish.  In this case, the 
activities of these new mediators consisted of producing Apps and software to manage or 
catalogue data and to allow the general public and others to do the work of transparency 
monitoring.  Whilst Harvey et al’s case suggests a degree of ‘newness’ to the space that 
emerges, Qureshi’s descriptions elucidate a reconfiguration of pre-existing bureaucratic 
infrastructures and other sets of relations.  As David Harvey (2007) articulates, new spaces of 
accumulation under neoliberalism are often not ‘created’ but instead involve the displacement 
of that which occupied the space previously.  This ‘creative destruction’ is, for Harvey, a 




Qureshi (2015), Harvey et al (2012) and other rejoinders (e.g. Pattenden, 2010; Waquant, 2012 
Schwiter et all, 2018) have illustrated how bureaucratic transformations within welfare systems 
and development programs can be carriers of market interests.  Simultaneously, these, and 
others works, also show that while the state may, at times, be undermined, it remains deeply 
embroiled in these processes.  Additionally, neoliberal forms of self-making (which embody  
entrepreneurialism, competitiveness, independence, self-reliance etc.) are shown to penetrate 
beyond structural processes and become entwinned in subjectivitities of low-level bureaucrats 
and political actors.  In Saharanpur, too, an ‘entrepreneurial’ space (albeit one characterised by 
informality, precarity and insecurity) had emerged within a mediation infrastructure that was 
increasing colonised by the private sector.  Aadhaar applications and other digitised services, 
for example, were now primarily carried out by small-scale, local, ‘private sector’ agents who, 
in a context of low literacy and IT skills, mediated (for a charge) between citizens and the 
state’s online apparatus.   
Saharanpur, as with many other Indian cities, has seen a boom in these outlets in recent years 
with a large semi-formal industry developing around the administering of online processes.  
Many of these operations run within existing businesses such as internet shops or grocery 
stores, but various new outfits have also sprung up leading to the opening of a myriad of small 
agencies.  These brokers, who according to government figures number around 900,000 
nationally (UIDAI 2020a), need to be licenced by the state and are required to undertake 
training (either at a local training centre or a ‘Mega Training Camp’, often facilitated by private 
providers) and must sit a short exam to obtain Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) 
certification (UIDAI 2020b). Together with the supply and manufacture of equipment by 
companies such as Morpho and Mahindra Satyam, along with a myriad of other public and 
private sector actors undertaking a variety of roles, according to the UIDAI’s own language, 




(1) Registrars (either government or private sector) who can register citizens but also 
orchestrate registration to subcontracted (2) Enrolment Agencies.  In turn, agencies can 
establish permanent or temporary (3) Enrolment Centres comprising one or more (4) Enrolment 
stations where a photograph, iris scan, ten fingerprints and personal details are registered on 
equipment bought or leased from hardware and software vendors for upload to the Central 
Identities Data Repository (UIDAI 2019; pp. 1947-1948).       
Aslam, who ran an enrolment station as a private sector agent in a corner of his father’s shop, 
sat close the bottom of this structure.  The long-standing business that he and his father operated 
offered Photostat services, train tickets and online passport applications.  A year before, he had 
invested in the equipment for Aadhaar-issuing, at a cost of around 1 lakh5, and paid to sit the 
exam.  Technically, Aadhaar Enrolment and mandatory updating is free of charge at Aadhaar 
Enrolment and Update Centres, but most private sector outlets charge an additional fee of 
around 100-150rs paid by the applicant.  Whilst some agents, such as Aslam, purchased the 
equipment privately, others were provided it when they signed up to one of several private 
sector companies who would take commission on each transaction.   
In a nearby mohalla I met Naseer, who had previously worked for Smart ID.  Aged only 21 
and with limited education, he occupied a very different positionality to the netas and others 
who generally dominated spaces of mediation. He had been recruited through a broker, who in 
turn received a commission for each agent they contracted, a model which has been proclaimed 
by some as embodying the ideals of individual entrepreneurialism (e.g. Prahalad 2004).  The 
involvement of various private sector companies led to the emergence of a complex, and 
increasingly crowded, card and document issuing market in which companies competed, not 
only with each other, but also with local netas keen to retain their position within newly 




company, Smart ID.  However, their operations were suspended after a State Bank of India 
(SBI) sponsored Aadhaar Camp, set up on a field outside the city to issue cards, was hijacked 
by local netas intent on claiming the initiative for themselves in order to legitimise their 
authority in the eyes of others.  ‘During the camp’, he described, ‘there was a lot of competition 
between the different netas, they all tried to show their power, but they did it without the 
permission of the SBI, so the program was stopped’6. 
When the program of subcontracted Aadhaar agents restarted in 2013, Smart ID were joined 
by a variety of competitors in what was now a rapidly expanding market.  Inevitably this 
created increased competition and impacted on the sub-contracted agents themselves, as Naseer 
described:    
In the beginning, a company could get 50rs for each card they made.  Now though 
it is only 15-20rs.  In one city there may be 8 to 10 companies working.  Now the 
boys who do this work are divided into groups and then themselves make different 
distributors [e.g. a pyramid scheme arrangement].  The work is divided according 
to area, but some groups cannot complete enough so they go back to other work.  
Now the system for camps is closed, so if you want to make the Aadhaar card you 
have to pay.  In the camps it was free but in the permanent centre the fees can be 
anything from 50-1000rs.   
With the camps no longer running, many of those seeking an Aadhaar card found themselves 
attending private centres such as Aslam’s or going through agents such as Naseer.  Here, the 
fees could vary substantially.  To get a card legitimately (or at least under circumstances where 
you have all the ID and information needed) the price was rarely more than 150rs.  However, 




the ‘risks’ of completing online documentation without all the required checks.  Naseer 
explained how he began to engage in the taking of bribes whilst undertaking agent work: 
At first, we refused to help those people who did not have all the ID and relevant 
things.  However, our groups were mostly young boys and we wanted some 
enjoyment like movies or entertainment.  Many people came for making the 
Aadhaar cards illegally, but we selected those people who could give us good 
money, who looked rich, we only did this with this sort of person.  In Saharanpur 
people gave 1000rs for it but in Dehradun7 we could get up to 5000rs.  We could 
complete this work in just 5 minutes.  
The digitisation of Aadhaar and other PDS schemes, then, has not removed forms of 
‘corruption’ or mediation from the process but has often involved the marketization of 
mediation pathways and actors, with workers such as Naseer operating in precarious conditions 
best described as ‘organised informality’.  Here, the symbolic terrain of formality (e.g. 
uniforms, training programs, digital technology etc.) act to mask the inherent informality, 
insecurity and precarity of labour (Gooptu 2013).  Hence, through the processes outlined in 
this article, spaces of mediation within a context previously dominated by socially embedded 
political actors, were opened up to the private sector and to emerging forms of accumulation 
within PDS and ID provisioning systems.   
Whilst poorer and marginalised communities in India have long experienced the state through 
the market in the form of both non-monetised (e.g. votes or familial/community obligations) 
and monetised (e.g. bribes) transactions (Tarlo 2003), the marketization of PDS and ID delivery 
has reconfigured mediation pathways in favour of corporate interests.   This is far from the dis-




all levels and involves new actors (both human and non-human).  Yet, mediation itself has not 
disappeared and there is no direct connection between people and the state.   
Conclusion:  Digitisation at the Margin 
It is important to clarify at the opening of this conclusion that my intention has not been to reify 
sifarish as an idealised mode of mediation.  As we have seen, it is a highly ambivalent practice 
which creates various forms of exclusion and inclusion.  However, what can be argued is that 
emerging digital pathways are no less ambivalent.  Whilst the netas and others discussed in 
this article play to their own concerns and seek to legitimise their authority, they are also 
embroiled in degrees of obligation to the community from which they emerge.  Thus, 
digitisation has resulted in Muslim residents of the mohallas losing a degree of access to the 
state through their ‘own’ intermediaries.  Newly emerging actors, such as Aslam and Naseer – 
described in the latter section of this article – may also be drawn from the city’s Muslim 
mohallas but they lack the political clout and ability to deploy sifarish that local netas possess.  
Thus, they have limited capacity to modify and correct perceived inequalities or errors in 
bureaucratic systems.  They are also, often, motivated by short-term monetary gain rather than 
the long term accumulation of social capital (in the Bordieuan sense of the term) that represents 
the primary drive for netas and others mediating between their vote base and other sites of 
political and bureaucratic engagement.      
Consequently, for India’s marginal and minority communities, this results in a draining away 
of power from political actors emerging from within the community to new players who 
operate in a precarious neoliberal market economy which negates, to a degree at least, an 
identity-based politics of representation.  However, the ‘spaces of mediation’ discussed in this 
article are by no means fixed and, as illustrated by the hijacking of the Aadhaar camp by various 




as change and are regularly contested and negotiated in various ways.  As the digitised state 
becomes more embedded, so these low-level political actors may find new means through 
which to legitimate their authority or prove capable of capturing emerging digital pathways 
within existing avenues of patronage, clientelism and sifarish.  As the materiality of the ‘paper 
state’ gives way to the supposed ‘immateriality’ and ‘rationality’ of online systems, so our 
attention as ethnographers should turn to both intended and untended consequences of material 
transformations at the level of everyday politics and sociality.  Yet, clearly these are not 
coincidental, organic formations assembling together in contexts where human agency and ‘the 
social’ are reduced to equivalents of non-human actants.  Rather, what this analysis of 
digitisation shows us is the centrality of political economy, ideological projects and social 
relations within the assemblage of digital transformations.   
1 All names are pseudonyms.  
2 Saharanpur comprises 70 wards.  Wards may constitute more than one mohalla.  
3 Writing and research for this article was undertaken prior to Covid-19, with the pandemic arriving in the 
latter stages of revision. It is worth noting, however, that the processes described here have also become 
deeply entangled within the biopolitics of the crisis.  India’s Muslim minority, in particular, have experienced 
an intensifying of state violence and both right-wing media and political actors have attempted to connect the 
spread of the pandemic with India’s Muslim population under the banner of ‘Covid Jihad’.   
4 There has recently been a lot of attention given to this in the media with celebrities and politicians being 
exposed as having access to subsidised rice despite their substantial wealth.  For example, the recent scandal 
involving Deepika Padukone, Sonakshi Sinha, Jacqueline Fernandez and Rani Mukherjee (The Hindu, 2016). 
5 100,000 INR 
6 Naseer’s account is his own recollection so may contain some inaccuracies.  However, the general context he 
describes is aligned with broader fieldwork and research conducted for this article.   
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